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Abstract 
Lacking civil and political rights, over 30 million noncitizens in the United States hold de 
facto citizenship through the accumulation of social rights. Although governments confer 
rights, the United States relies on non-profit human service organizations to deliver many 
social support services. As the primary institution that interacts with noncitizens, human 
service organizations not only make policy in practice, but also play a key role in 
determining who gets to stay and who should receive help in doing so. This arrangement 
poses important questions: How do human services interact with pressures from 
immigration and welfare regulation? How does the institutional and organizational 
environment affect professionals’ prioritization of services and client selection?  Through 
ethnographic interviews with human service directors, this study analyzed on the ground 
policy implementation and how noncitizens gain access to social rights and legitimacy. 
Due to regulatory pressures and referrals across professional networks, human services 
adopt similar practices and structures that decreased case variability irrespective of 
noncitizen’s needs. Additionally, directors responded to uncertainty in their work by 
using formal intake processes to serve varied interests and motivations. Thus, the 
immigration policy environment constrains discretion and narrows directors’ practical 
understanding of eligibility, limiting rather than expanding access to social rights. 
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In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security estimated 11.5 million individuals 
resided in the United States as undocumented residents without a legal status. Legal 
noncitizens comprise nearly twice as many individuals (Hoefer et al. 2012). With over 30 
million diverse individuals in the United States occupying the boundary formally outside 
of “citizen,” the relationship between noncitizen populations, the state, and immigration 
law continues to pose important questions. The term noncitizen broadly includes many 
different immigrant statuses outside of formal legal citizenship such as undocumented 
immigrant, refugee, and legal resident. While the stagnant binary categories of legal and 
illegal immigrant no longer aptly apply as absolute designations, studies of immigrant 
populations focus on the impacts that changes in immigration law have on noncitizen 
immigrants and how subsequent changes in legal frameworks restructure rights and 
notions of citizenship more broadly (Coutin 2011). 
 
Although immigration policy powerfully influence noncitizens’ legal status and 
access or exclusions to rights, noncitizens do not directly experience policymakers, 
regulatory agencies, and legal statutes in their daily lives. Rather, non-state human 
service organizations implementing indeterminate immigration laws govern the rights 
and statuses of noncitizens. As the primary institutions interacting with noncitizens, 
human service organizations not only make policy in practice, but also play a key role in 
constructing legitimate social membership and providing needed social services—
determining who stays in the United States and who should receive help in doing so. 
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 This qualitative study analyzes how human service organizations provide services 
to noncitizens and how institutional pressures from the policy environment structure 
services to marginalized immigrant populations. I ask: In what ways do organizations 
interact with regulatory pressures from immigration and welfare regulation? How do 
these institutional factors and the human services environment affect how professionals 
prioritize services and client selection to ultimately decide who can receive access to 
rights and social citizenship? 
 
Through in-depth interviews with eight directors of non-profit human service 
organizations, I argue that human services, despite dedication to helping those in need, 
are limited in the ways that they can help noncitizens and thus generally provide services 
to a narrow category of marginalized immigrants. Due to a pervasive homogenous 
structure and diffusion of similar practices throughout the human services field, only a 
small selection of services and clients receive help. These services exclude most groups 
of noncitizens and their needs. Further, although human service directors want to help 
everyone in need, directors do not use their discretion to expand client bases and services, 
but instead act in ways that resonate with a restrictive policy environment. Directors 
privilege cases where individuals are in need of the most social services yet are unlikely 
to be too complicated, while they turn down cases with less marginalized individuals. 
Services are mostly reserved for traumatized noncitizens who fit clear legal categories of 
welfare eligibility, asylees, refugees, or victims of specific crimes, resulting in a 
hierarchy of cases where marginalization and victimization held the most merit. 
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Additionally, directors’ selection of cases with “merit” often meant looking for specific 
characteristics: hardworking individuals who reflect the restrictive policy environment. 
 
In this paper, I first provide an overview of the theoretical framing of citizenship 
that drives my study and the relevant policy environment concerning welfare and 
immigration regulation. I then review neo-institutionalism as it applies to law and 
organizations, explaining how human service organizations may contribute to broader 
notions of citizenship. In my findings, I will show how the regulatory and professional 
environment of human services resulted in coercive and normative pressures that 
influenced homogeneity in structure and practices, and limited to whom and what social 
services are provided. Additionally, my findings indicate that individual directors 
exercise strategic action within their organizations in order to serve personal and 
organizational interests. This discretion in making decisions and putting institutional 
processes into practice, however, did not result in unintended or divergent aims from the 
policy environment. Furthermore, the limited access noncitizens have to services is a 
clear restriction on their access to social rights and legitimacy. 
 
This study hopes to increase academic interest in how noncitizens engage with the 
law in everyday practice. Particularly, this study examines one of the ways noncitizens 
establish rights and enter into legitimate relations with the state. In examining the role of 
human service organizations, this study does not intend to take for granted the agency 
exercised by noncitizens in mobilizing for rights or negotiating their own status, but 
attention must be paid not only to affective experiences but also the intermediary role of 
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social institutions in the noncitizen/state relationship (Abrego 2008, Glenn 2010). 
Sociological research using a neoinstitutionalist framework is not new, but organizational 
studies of non-profits have not focused in depth on institutional fields and how they affect 
the rights and services delivered to immigrants or how it contributes to the understanding 
and empirical experience of citizenship materially. Furthermore, a law and organizations 
framework provides a missing emphasis concerning the mediated implementation of law 
and its effects on noncitizens’ experience of immigration policy in daily life. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Immigration, Citizenship, and De Facto Legitimacy 
At the heart of citizenship is the mechanism to regulate membership status 
through rules of inclusion and exclusion, which by nature generates a system of 
inequality regarding who belongs and who does not. While scholarly research 
traditionally tied citizenship to membership status within a political entity joined by 
notions of ethnicity and territory, citizen and immigration research turned towards a 
citizenship beyond the nation-state. Rather, citizenship studies placed research in relation 
to globalization, transmigration, cosmopolitanism, and human rights (Soysal 2000, 
Bosniak 2000). Regardless of the territorial context of citizenship, contemporary 
citizenship as an analytic category exists along multiple dimensions of citizenship types 
and rights: civil, political, and social citizenship. 
 
Somewhat divergent, but inextricably linked to civil and political citizenship, is 
the social element of citizenship, on which this paper will focus. T.H. Marshall refers to 
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social citizenship as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare 
and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (1998: 96). It is 
essentially the social recognition and full inclusion in a community—recognition of one’s 
personhood, moral equality and dignity, and social legitimacy as sufficient for receiving 
social protections and social acceptance (Sommers 2008). Contemporary social 
citizenship is exercised primarily through public education and social services as 
protections from a liberal capitalist market (Bosniak 1998).  
 
These analytic elements of citizenship—the civil, political, and social—can be 
viewed along theoretical dimensions of legal status, civil rights, political participation, 
and a sense of belonging (Marshall 1998, Bloemraad et al. 2008). The intersection of 
these dimensions results in undermining and reinforcing individual boundaries of 
membership, making the citizenship experience dependent on various processes of 
bundling different benefits together. Thus, citizenship is a complex institutional 
mechanism that produces social stratification of different identities and rights where 
some individuals receive more rights in theory than they receive in practice (Marshall 
1998, Bloemraad et al. 2008). Research on noncitizens’ rights in the United States 
initially concerned different membership definitions of illegal and legal as defined by 
changes in immigration policy and economic push and pull factors of undocumented 
migration (Espenshade 1995, Coutin 2011). Regardless of the motivations behind 
immigration, the diverse population of immigrants within the United States complicated 
the traditional assignment of citizenship and the ascription of rights. In varying degrees, 
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immigrants in the United States were granted de facto access to civil and social 
citizenship without the de jure qualification of political citizenship. Because immigration 
policy is not static, the provision of rights to various immigrants continues to change. 
 
Brief History of Immigration and Welfare Policy 
To contextualize social citizenship within social services, I will review 
immigration policy trends in the United States that relate to welfare policy and human 
service organizations. In general, human service organizations work within a policy field 
characterized by challenges and contradictions at both the federal and state level. 
Operating within a policy field that contains broad sweeping federal laws that are 
permissive towards undocumented migration but lack provisions for a social safety net, 
human services must also contend with attempts at the state level to unofficially make 
restrictive immigration regulation through prohibitive welfare policies. 
 
Within the policy field, federal immigration legislation, though traditionally 
restrictive, is not stringently enforced. Though Congress usually employs a rhetorical 
anti-immigration framework, it seldom enacts federal legislation concerning citizenship 
and immigration. This results from a neoliberal paradox of policies where the desire for 
open markets and cheap labor in the United States conflicts with the closure of 
citizenship and borders (Varsanyi 2008: 879). Neoliberalism as an economic doctrine 
privileges a free and deregulated market. Similarly, as a political ideology, its exercise 
adheres to libertarian values of property rights and individualism combined with a 
morally conservative view of the family, meritocracy, and nationalism (Hartman 2005: 
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59). In practice, governments with such ideals facilitate the alignment of subjects’ 
individual goals and national aims by creating laws that assist individuals “to practice 
their freedom, but only in ways the state has defined anteriorly—for example as workers 
rather than as welfare recipients” (Hartman 2005: 60). In the United States, immigrants 
(both legal and illegal) are treated as the new subjects of neoliberal principles because a 
significant portion of the labor force relies on their presence. In effect, the federal 
government can enact contradictory policies that include militarizing and defending its 
borders yet also provide for lax internal policing of undocumented labor. In doing so, the 
government appears to be hard on immigration in theory, yet still benefits economically 
in practice. 
 
Open labor markets and an economy supported by immigrants, however, require 
some system of social and civil support where none tends to exist in the political realm. 
Yet, rather than the federal government, states and local governments bear the burden of 
providing services to assist undocumented immigrants—the subjects of federal 
immigration policy (Espenshade 1995, Varsanyi 2008: 879, Coleman 2007). The United 
States is a liberal, or neoliberal, welfare regime in which dominant policy initiatives 
consist of market solutions and means-tested benefits, like food stamps or disability 
benefits (Sainsbury 2006). The modern U.S. welfare state, since its founding during the 
New Deal, has provided varying degrees of state funded social services. Initially 
developed to provide selective public assistance to certain “deserving” populations of the 
poor, only the blind, the disabled, the elderly and mothers of single families received aid 
(Sainsbury 2006: 232). Immigrants in particular were excluded from welfare access until 
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the government created the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI). Access was 
also formally extended in 1970 when the Supreme Court ruled in Graham v. Richardson 
that state governments could not deny welfare benefits to resident noncitizens. Now 
including legal permanent residents, refugees, and immigrants admitted for humanitarian 
purposes, state welfare programs began stressing different entry categories for access as a 
way to limit beneficiaries. Furthermore, in the 1980s, the Reagan administration not only 
introduced more restrictive eligibility requirements, particularly for immigrants, but also 
simultaneously implemented spending cutbacks to state run welfare programs. His 
administration also developed increasingly more financial and programmatic 
relationships with non-profits (Boris 1999: 1-33, Sainsbury 2006). Though a formal 
welfare state exists, many of its functions operate through private non-profit 
organizations rather than federal or state managed programs. 
 
By the 1990s both welfare and immigration reform changed the scope of 
immigrant social rights. Following a suite of Congressional acts in 1996, immigration 
policy began to restrict and regulate immigrants themselves rather than migration. The 
most notable of these policies were the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA). PRWORA reclassified noncitizens into qualified categories that restricted 
eligibility for welfare and social protections. The act restricted benefits to certain 
immigrants by denying all federal benefits to those who were not residents of five 
years—implying through practice that undocumented residents were ineligible for 
 10
publicly funded state or local services with the limited exceptions of emergency care. 
Further, the act gave full discretion to states to decide eligibility for their social programs, 
allowing some states to exercise exclusionary practices against noncitizens (Shin 2006, 
Varsanyi 2008). Similarly, the AEDPA and IIRIRA contributed to a roll back of rights 
that noncitizens enjoyed by default. Under the AEDPA, local police had the authority to 
arrest previously deported noncitizen felons. Increasing the risk of deportability, the 
IIRIRA enabled local and state authorities to enforce federal civil immigration violations.  
 
 These laws concerning both welfare and immigration illustrate how enforcement 
and formulation of membership policies underwent devolution of control to state and 
local governments (Varsanyi 2008). This rescaling signifies another level where 
noncitizens negotiate rights, but also a reconfiguration of immigration enforcement to 
state and non-state actors at local levels (Coleman 2007, Coutin 2011, Varsanyi 2008). 
Although U.S. immigration policy effectively compelled states to bear the brunt of 
providing rights to noncitizens, the devolution of immigration policy further highlighted 
the role of local institutions in carrying out the law and a turn toward immigration policy 
on the ground, in which some states are considerably more restrictive than others. 
 
Neo-institutionalist Theory and Law and Organizations 
Empirical studies of immigration policy and citizenship call for further attention 
on implementation and the rights of noncitizens (Abrego 2008, Gilboy 1997). This 
research turned toward the site of implementation: the organization and its institutional 
field (Coleman 2007, Gilboy 1997, Coutin 2011). Because institutions form both the 
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formal and taken-for-granted norms that shape what individuals and organizations do, 
neo-institutionalist studies of organizations focus on how actors make decisions when 
confronting uncertainty concerning expectations, their chances of success, permitted 
behavior, or goals, in order to pursue specific interests (Brinton and Nee 1998: 8). I will 
review organizational isomorphism, strategic action, and discretionary decoupling as 
theoretical explanations for how human service professionals respond to uncertainty in 
their line of work and how these processes produce organizational behavior. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell argue that organizations deal with uncertainty by becoming 
rationalized, bureaucratized, and standardized across the field. Not only do structures of 
different organizations become identical, but so does culture, organizational behavior, 
and what the organization produces (1983: 147). Organizational similarity occurs through 
coercive, mimetic, and normative processes. When organizations experience pressures 
from the state or regulatory environments to adopt certain practices or fulfill 
requirements, coercive homogenization occurs. Similarly, when organizations are 
uncertain about how to operate or whether or not they will be successful they can adopt 
the practices of other organizations that appear successful. This mimetic isomorphism 
makes organizations appear legitimate. Lastly, organizations can become identical as a 
result of professional networks and ethics. Normative pressures can be standards set by 
professionals or by a particular professional culture (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). 
 
At times, however, because institutional rules are not coherent and there is 
uncertainty within an organizational environment, opportunities for individual discretion 
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and agency are available. Neo-institutionalist theories that focus on individual actors and 
institutional pressure use a “choices within constraints” model whereby actors act 
strategically by making decisions that intentionally pursue a broad set of interests. 
Individual strategic action reduces uncertainty of success by establishing or working 
within practices that fulfill both individual and organizational interests (Beckert 1999: 
782). These decisions however are context-bound by limited knowledge concerning the 
outcomes of their decisions and are further limited to the customs, myths, and ideology of 
the institutional field (Brinton and Nee 1998: 8, Ingram and Clay 2000, Paul DiMaggio 
1998). This manifests as decision-making that considers only certain types of rationales 
present in an environment, which are thus created within the organization itself. 
 
Neo-institutionalist studies of organizations and law emphasize strategic action 
and discretion as a decoupling mechanism. These studies focus on law as the institutional 
environment and how actors use, ignore, or circumvent the law’s formal and informal 
influence (Edelman et al. 2010: 655). Organizations become the arena where actors 
collectively construct the meaning of compliance to law and act strategically to utilize 
their discretion to reinforce law or change legal meaning. Decoupling occurs when 
practices and individual action diverge from legal ideals but are still technically within 
the formal rules, enabling organizations to comply with law symbolically and to create 
legal norms endogenously—regardless of formal legal intent (Edelman et al. 2010: 656).  
 
Since individuals inhabit institutions, strategic action requires individuals to make 
sense of what to do by using frameworks and knowledge available to them within their 
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environment. This can include formal and informal understandings of the law. For 
example, Marshall (2005) illustrated how a university created sexual harassment 
grievance procedures that constructed how employees understood what sexual 
harassment looked like, and in doing so sought to protect the organization from legal 
action rather than the victims of sexual harassment. In the context of non-profits, Carmin 
and Jehlicka (2008) demonstrated how non-profit organizations respond to institutional 
pressures that arise from different environmental logics. By examining a Czech non-
profit, the authors show how under state socialism the organization symbolically 
complied to state mandates by creating a formal structure that had little to do with its 
actual anti-socialist activities. Similarly, Binder (2007) examined the discretion exercised 
by individuals in a transitional housing non-profit where employees complied with 
federal funding constraints but utilized differing logics to make decisions based on 
professional commitments, personal preferences, and local concerns. Therefore, 
decoupling discretion indicates that organizations can create unexpected outcomes to 
laws that are meant to regulate them by making decisions that meet their formal demands 
as well as the interests of their organizations (Edelman 1992, Nelson et al. 2008, Marshall 
2005, Stone and Sandfort 2009). In the sense that organizations implement policy in ways 
that differ from formal legal intent, the effects of policy-making essentially rest in the 
processes of organizations and individual actors.  
 
Additionally, in the context of noncitizens’ rights and immigration policy, the 
implementation of policy at the level of human service agents determines the rights that 
could accrue to noncitizens. The police officers, school teachers, social workers, and 
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public attorneys who work in the human services industry are the primary institutional 
actors engaging with noncitizens; these street-level bureaucrats similarly utilize 
discretion to comply to institutional demands while pursuing self-interest or the 
organization’s mission (Lipsky 1980, Gilboy 1997, Abrego 2008). The role of human 
service professionals, in mediating the legal expectations of an organization and the 
people they serve, construct the norms of institutional practice. By doing so, they also 
affect the impact of law on its intended subjects.  
 
This study seeks to follow previous studies by examining immigration policy on 
the ground as it affects noncitizens. However, in researching the role of human service 
organizations I specifically apply neo-institutionalist theories regarding organizations and 
individual agency to understand how the broader environment affects professional 
discretion. Although the policy environment formally empowers human service 
organizations to serve noncitizens’ social needs, these organizations do not operate in a 
vacuum and as such are open to constraints through restrictive and ambiguous 
immigration and welfare policies. Institutional practices directly affect how services are 
provided, and thereby what aspects of citizenship noncitizens may experience. The 
expansion or contraction of social services alters how social rights and social legitimacy 
are allocated to noncitizens. In examining human service organizations through theories 
of isomorphism and strategic action, we can understand the many pathways in which 
regulatory environments affect and transform these de facto rights on the ground. 
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Methods 
 I collected my data using ethnographic interviews with individuals who occupied 
decision-making positions within their organizations—program directors and department 
heads who worked in a major metropolitan area of a Midwest state. I interviewed eight 
directors from seven different organizations. The subject population of this study centers 
on human service organizations that provide free social services to immigrant 
populations. Although this study aims to provide information about the larger 
institutional field of social services, I ground it in a small slice of organizations in one 
area. Electing a balance of breadth and depth of non-profit human service organizations, I 
used purposive sampling to select participants. The organizations were selected on the 
basis of their proximity to a metropolitan city and reputation for providing services to 
immigrant and marginalized populations. I chose respondents based on their positions. As 
a program director of an organization, these roles were likely to have considerable 
administrative responsibilities as well as access to clients through direct service work. I 
looked to speak with program directors because they were in the position to have 
comprehensive knowledge regarding their organizations’ missions, programs/services, 
resources, as well as have decision-making capabilities for their organization. 
 
The eight respondents in this study represent a diverse set of service providers 
available to immigrant populations. Organizations ranged from immigrant-oriented 
services to those services available to both citizens and noncitizens alike. While only half 
of the organizations dealt exclusively with providing legal services to immigrant 
populations, the second portion primarily served immigrant communities despite having 
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more open target populations. The services provided by study participants ranged from a 
variety of legal issues, to a broad range of immigration issues, to the acquisition of basic 
needs such as food and housing, employment services, and psychological services. In 
common, all organizations studied limited their services to low-income individuals within 
a specified geographic area. In total, individual respondents encompassed directors of 
legal clinics, legal aid societies, non-profit legal services, interpersonal clinics, a food 
shelf, adult education and English instruction, and a refugee resettlement agency.  
 
I visited each organization to interview directors and observe the physical 
environment of staff. The duration of each interview lasted between one hour and an hour 
and a half. While recording the interviews, I took extensive notes that I included 
alongside interview transcripts for analysis. Ethnographic interviews and observations 
allowed me to understand the motivations behind organizational practices and how actors 
understood and made decisions. In analyzing the relationship among the institutional 
environment, the human services, and directors in policy implementation, interviews 
allowed me to investigate organizational and individual perceptions of decision-making 
and constraints. 
 
By structuring interviews with program directors to discuss their daily work, 
routine processes in service provision, organizational structure, and common challenges, 
I was able to collect narratives that explained how non-profit human services fit within an 
immigration policy environment and how this may present challenges to delivering 
services. Although interviews and content analysis are common research methods in 
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studying both noncitizens and organizations, the study of noncitizens, rights mobilization, 
and immigration policy impacts are typically conducted with the noncitizen populations 
themselves or solely at the policy level. Less scholarly attention is given to immigration 
policy at different levels of implementation, particularly in conjunction with studies of 
non-profits and their role in mediating policy. 
 
This study aimed to analyze the role of human services in facilitating noncitizens 
access to services and social rights by identifying what organizational and individual 
factors contributed to deciding who received help and how directors negotiated these 
constraints. Throughout my interviews, I encouraged directors to discuss the structure 
and goals of the organization, their role, and how their organizations compared to others. 
I often asked about challenges to the operation of the organization as well as challenges 
that individual directors confronted when trying to do their work. If directors mentioned 
requirements, policies they had to abide by, and the impact of anti-immigration laws on 
their clients, I probed to uncover how they understood these issues and how this 
understanding influenced their daily work and long-term goals. Questions also focused on 
actual service provision of the organizations and how individual directors dealt with 
direct client work and client selection. As expected, this generated discussion of routine 
practices that streamlined client selection as well as how individual directors made 
decisions about what to do and whom to help when problems occurred. 
 
Findings 
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Despite variation across organizations, interviews revealed that the human service 
directors confronted similar uncertainties concerning funding, goals within limited 
organizational capacity, and effective resource management. Confronted with these 
uncertainties and a large population of clients, human services followed similar practices 
and offered the same rationales to legitimize their service choices. The practical result of 
isomorphism was a caseload that did not deviate far from the previous explicitly 
preferred government allowances for asylees, refugees, crime victims and legally eligible 
welfare recipients. Directors responded to uncertainty of resources and a desire to help 
everyone in need by using intake practices to meet their interests in effectively expending 
resources and being successful. This discretion however did not expand who received 
help, but rather isolated a narrow selection of clients to a restrictive hierarchy of 
characteristics: vulnerability, welfare eligibility, and merit. Overall, noncitizens faced 
restrictive access to rights through human services. 
 
Coercive Isomorphism: Role of Government Regulation 
An institutional environment represents norms, values, and sets of beliefs enacted 
through rules to which organizations must conform if they are to acquire the legitimacy 
necessary for success (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the human services sector, 
organizations rely significantly on financial contracts with government agencies and 
wealthy grant foundations to conduct their work. Continued funding from these sources 
ensures financial survival and opportunities for growth. Every human service 
organization interviewed received government funding through state or federal contracts. 
The more an organization’s finances depended on these contracts, the higher the 
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likelihood that an organization’s interests and services aligned with state demands. 
Similarly, grant sources from non-government bodies also set requirements for formal 
rules and specific goals. In particular, as these human services often worked with 
immigrants, there were strict stipulations concerning who could receive help using these 
funds. Directors cited federal grants as the primary source of government money. Mostly 
providing for refugee resettlement work, organizations had very clear restrictions on how 
this money should be spent and how to report expenses. In most cases, directors 
described a narrow source of government funds available to help immigrants. Limited to 
helping individuals with legal status if they were using federal funds and excluded from 
using state funded grants to advocate on Federal issues like immigration, organizations 
tried to seek a significant portion of their operating budgets from foundation grants, 
private donations, or partnerships with private institutions. This strategy however did not 
typically alter what organizations could do as even private sources of money set 
requirements regarding permissible services and reporting expectations. 
 
According to Weisbrod (1998), non-profit funding becomes a “sale” when the 
non-profit must relinquish control over their activities in order to satisfy buyers, and in 
that vein the non-profit’s successful pursuit of goals is constrained by a funder’s 
demands. Government funding requirements also established a way for organizations to 
show accountability and transparency in meeting mandates that existed. Although the 
human services organizations interviewed were very different in scope, they operated 
with similar practices and structure as a response to uncertainty concerning service 
prioritization and client selection. The most prominent manifestation of regulatory 
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pressure was the intake process, which was rationalized and routinized across the range 
of services. All organizations featured a required process used to screen for individuals 
that fit specific mandates. To varying degrees of strictness, each human service required 
potential clients to undergo screening and client intake. The screening interview and 
intake process measured eligibility and streamlined classification of applicants within 
cases and welfare eligibility. Client intake and screening served not only to identify the 
type of case, but whether the case would have merit to take or would be successful. 
 
Processes of screening and intake followed similar steps across human services. 
First, individual applicants were required to provide evidence of low-income eligibility 
and some corroboration of geographic residence. One legal services director and 
advocacy agency stated, “Income piece for most people is key. Most of the free social 
services are restricted. And they don’t want to be working with someone for a long time 
and they’re like ‘you make 60 [thousand].’” With those grounds established, intake 
practices question the individual about their situation, their needs, their legal status, and 
any problems that may exist for the applicant. In most of the human services, an 
additional in-person interview would occur, should potential clients pass the requirements 
of the first screening. During the interviews, organizations would additionally use a 
statewide benefits database to further check on clients, ascertaining possible state welfare 
and tax support benefits. The established purpose for intake is to ensure that individuals 
served do indeed fit within the cases usually taken and meet funding mandates.  
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The types of services available to noncitizens typically depended on what 
government money was willing to fund rather than any response to demands or needs of 
the community. Even in cases where funding wasn’t restricted, organizations tended to 
prioritize the same services as organizations under restricted funding. Generally, the most 
direct funded service provided pathways to welfare access for asylees and refugees. Other 
funds used to serve immigrant populations were indirect funds provided for specific 
welfare services such as housing, employment, disabilities, and other basic needs. 
Although some organizations in the study were more dependent on government grants 
than others, every organization prioritized similar cases. Regardless of whether they had a 
contract to do so, the human services organizations overwhelmingly provided services to 
asylee, refugee, and domestic and sexual violence cases. Those that provided a specialty 
in legal services all focused primarily on legal status cases that involved “trauma”—
victims of a crime/sexual assault and asylees. On the other hand, human services that 
provided basic needs emphasized housing, clothing, food stamps, cash assistance and 
employment counseling to refugees.  
 
Services concentrated on these small groups of asylees, refugees, and victims of 
crime despite every director emphasizing other groups of noncitizens that needed help 
and were technically eligible. Influenced heavily by government-approved cases, 
organizations rarely ventured to expand services to include broader groups of people. 
Most organizations described a high density of detained immigrants (en route for removal 
from the country) as a priority target group for their services, but such cases were not 
prioritized. As an example, one director who worked with almost no restricted funding, 
 22
discussed a high demand and dire need for detained immigrant cases, “I think in general 
case priority has changed in the last ten years into moving beyond exclusively asylum 
work into how U.S. immigration policy changed and affected wide swaths of the 
population—who is getting detained and deported and why.”  Nonetheless, like the other 
organizations in this study, services were usually directed to those cases that had an 
established precedent of government funding, 
We’ll take cases that we’ll handle start to finish. Those will be asylum, crime 
victims, violence against women, and trafficking visas. Those are the bulk. 
There’re a lot of asylum services around the country. Historically, we’ve mostly 
taken asylum, I think we’ve moved beyond that in terms of VAWA [Violence 
Against Women] and U [visas for crime victims], and we don’t take walk in 
clients. 
 
Organizational priorities for consistent service provisions, a complete rather than 
fragmented service delivery to clients, and a commitment to cases with a track record of 
success elevate government-funded cases and restrictions to influence case selection and 
other organizational services. As a result of the pattern of restrictions set by government-
funded cases, every human service prioritized the same caseload. Government regulation 
distinctly exerted coercive pressure on the organizations to provide similar services to 
concentrated groups. Within the human services field, preferences for victim and trauma 
based cases were diffuse even when funding was not restricted. 
 
Normative Isomorphism: Professional Standardization through Referrals  
Across the human services organizations, interview respondents frequently 
participated in similar professional networks. Many of the directors spoke often of the 
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other organizations in the study and frequently referenced program links, referrals, and 
collaborations with each other and other organizations in Midwest state. One link in 
particular stood out as a process of standardization. Referrals of clients relied on using 
similar screening requirements, a standard rationale for case classifications, and an 
understanding of other organization’s processes and requirements. Though no director 
felt that their screening processes were identical, the ease and frequency of case referrals 
required using similar case classifications and standards. For instance, most directors 
emphasized using the same determination for income eligibility at 133% of the poverty 
line, rather than the Federal guideline of 150%. Additionally, one director explained, 
We take referrals that have already been screened. Each organization has their 
own way of doing it. I think at [other organization in study] they’ve got a fairly 
standard intake form. They do at least one interview, write a description of it and 
share it. They know that we have psychologists on staff, so when they refer 
someone they will know that and that will effect who they refer over. So someone 
who is maybe in a bit more fragile state they’ll refer to us. The referrals we get 
from the county, they just write up an email, most of the time I’m saying no 
because they haven’t been properly screened, but she will just keep sending me 
possible cases. 
 
Human services organizations operating within the same network relied on transparent 
processes of intake and referral that reflected shared standards and mutual knowledge 
regarding peer organizations’ resources and needs. When organizations outside of the 
professional network attempt to make a referral, directors typically didn’t accept them 
because these referrals lacked the same professional standards and familiarity with 
organizational practices necessary for legitimacy in the professional network. 
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Furthermore, referrals are so institutionalized as a human service wide practice 
that almost all of the organizations kept a referral handbook to connect clients to referral 
agencies or to other human services based on need area. The screening process of human 
services served as a response to the uncertainty of client prioritization. Because human 
services organizations used screening to select for certain clients—typically government 
funded cases or potential welfare benefits cases—referrals circulated only those types of 
cases to other human services. Working with other organizations that served marginalized 
immigrant populations required some degree of homogeneity across the professional 
networks that provided different services. In this respect, the similarities across human 
services and the standardization of the screening process contributed to an almost 
undifferentiated client selection and service provision.  
 
Individual Uncertainty: Missions, What to Provide, Who to Serve 
Despite organizational differences and service type, every human services 
organization had relatively the same mission statement or organizational goal. Because of 
uncertainty regarding whom they could help, the human services organizations expressed 
a general mission to serve those who needed the most help. With a broad emphasis of 
helping low-income individuals within a specific geographic area, organizations could 
keep their goal threshold low ideally to accommodate service needs, funding, capacity, 
and immigration flows. However, individual program directors, when asked specifically 
about the goals or mission of their respective organizations, answered with uncertainty. 
Most said they served low income and the most vulnerable and marginalized people. One 
legal aid attorney stated, “It’s the most marginalized non citizens and citizens—it’s to get 
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the most basic things to survive, money to support yourself, a status to be free from fear 
of deportation, housing security, basic needs for self sufficiency.”  With each 
organization supporting a generic and similar mission statement, directors could not draw 
on it to clearly inform how to structure service or prioritize clients. 
 
Directors often cited being unsure about who would receive services and what 
cases the organization would take. As the goals of these organizations were broad and 
solely amounted to loose criteria to help the most vulnerable and low-income, the target 
populations of human services was just as indeterminate. Although every organization 
could articulate whom they were helping—low-income individuals who were mostly 
immigrants—it was difficult for directors to describe their client bases. When asked, 
participants differentiated on the basis of ethnicity/national origin. Though common 
groups were East African, Central American, and displaced South Asian populations. 
Regardless, almost every director responded with, “it depends on the case” even though 
they also described the cases they took as standardized. One participant who worked for 
an advocacy and legal services organization stated, “In theory the constituency we’re 
advocating for, that we’re providing direct services to is immigrants. But there’s no broad 
constituency that’s really called immigrants at all. That’s just another challenge is that 
there’s a lot of disparate voices.”  Immigrants, as the populations they were serving, were 
often tabled for other higher order descriptions. In most cases, the dichotomy of illegal 
and legal did not arise in the description of clients. For most organizations, it was either a 
fact or an assumption that clients were either undocumented or on their way. 
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Directors’ Strategies of Responding to Uncertainty 
  Negotiating Formal Organizational Practices. Although organizations had 
generic missions to guide their staff, directors were able to assert their own motivations 
into the organization’s ambiguous goals. Almost all directors saw their current work as an 
extension of a passion or rewarding experience in their life. Participants easily expressed 
a connection between the services provided and their own personal convictions. 
However, organizational directors did not always connect their motives and their work 
with the mission of the organization. For example, every interview participant had 
difficulty articulating or remembering organizational goals—or vaguely connected their 
role with the organization’s mission. Most expressed lip service to the tenets of the 
organization as they held their own personal motivations to be the most important 
rationale for cases. One director mentioned, 
I got my start in immigration work in college working with Central American 
refugees who were fleeing civil war and persecution in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. That’s how I cut my teeth into the issue. It was both professionally 
challenging and seemed like the right thing to be doing. My first job after 
graduating from law school was also working with a faith based institution and 
their primary clientele were Haitians and Liberians. Those two situations, where 
there seemed to be injustices going on, and people were fleeing, it just seemed 
like the right thing to do. And I just carried that with me. 
 
Across the eight directors, all previously volunteered with immigrant populations and 
some had even once volunteered at their current human service. Others started work as a 
continuance of their faith, previous experience working with non-American populations, 
or associated their work with language abilities and experiences abroad. 
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Since directors often had more definitive personal motivations than organizational 
goals, they often used the formal processes of the organization for unintended purposes. 
One way directors described strategically using intake for nonscreening purposes was to 
provide ancillary services that did not require funding or fulfilling mandates and quotas. 
Through the stages of intake, directors focused on both screening for eligibility and case 
requirements, but also used the interaction to seek and attend to other noncitizens’ 
needs—regardless of taking cases. Many directors made statements such as, 
Our client line is often used by people that don’t end up being clients, so we make 
a lot of referrals or give advice that way. If they call here and they try to 
naturalize and they find out that if they apply they’ll get put in removal 
proceedings—that’s a huge benefit for them [to know that information]. Even if 
we don’t take their case, they’ll learn something, get a referral to another 
organization or to serve their other needs, or understand that it might be more 
beneficial to not proceed with their case and that there are certain things that they 
can be doing to help them and to clearly understand the risks of their situation. 
 
Participants also stated that they provided other services to the client such as making 
necessary referrals, providing talk therapy, disseminate advice, provide access to and 
understand forms and documents, and even aided in simple tasks like translation. These 
actions however did not result in substantive changes to the clients or services provided. 
 
However, directors strategically used the intake process for other purposes that 
served both their interests and the interests of the organization. Intake became a method 
for organizational actors to prevent stress, employee burnout, and secondary 
traumatization. Though expressed by many directors, one particular director articulated 
this unintended effect of intake, 
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I actually think there’s a little bit of the intake process that I don’t think most 
people would consciously say. It’s very easy to be able to set up a gate and to say, 
look, here’s our gate and because there are... there’s this vision that there are 
heaps of people who need your help. The gate makes you feel safe. It helps to 
maintain—you could be doing a lot of crazy running around, and it helps to 
maintain a veneer of calm and efficiency. 
 
To underscore how organizational actors used organizational practices to balance the 
commitments of their work with their best interests, all of the organizations stated that 
their clients came to them by word of mouth rather than outreach or active marketing, 
Sometimes you’re in the room with people and you can feel the mood like we’re 
doing the best we can. It’s sort of like this entrenchment issue. And it’s like I have 
to focus on what I’m doing well and I can’t worry about… I’ve been in meetings 
where people are like “How do we make sure our clients can get access to 
services?”…. And there’s like this unspoken, look there’s a reason we don’t 
advertise, like we don’t need more people, we can’t possibly serve them well. We 
don’t want to look to redo or change. There’s a lot of lip service to outreach, a lot 
of it is serious about reaching out to communities, but there’s also this paralyzing 
fear like what happens if we do successful outreach… legal and social service 
workers are probably like, yeah, crap if we get 200 people showing up. 
 
Despite having very clear motivations to help everyone, organizational actors also 
recognized their own interests and sought organizationally approved ways of protecting 
their interests and motivations. Differing organizational priorities for program continuity 
as well as efficient resource management influenced director’s decisions and strategic use 
of intake. In order to satisfy both organizational priorities and individual interests, intake 
was commonly used as a method to decrease demand and access of noncitizens to 
services and minimize the groups of people that could possibly receive help.  
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Who Gets Served and Who Stays: Reaffirming Restrictive Regulation. Every 
human service prioritized cases by vulnerability, marginalization, and eligibility for 
welfare. In general, directors described the following as the target population, 
It’s the vulnerabilities of the person and the availability of the person to get 
assistance elsewhere. Like if there’s no one who is gonna take their case, or their 
capability to pay, or if they’re a victim, or a child, or homeless. You’re gonna 
want to take that case because they’re really in need of some sort of benefit you’re 
trying to get for them. When we’re doing a citizenship case, it’s not for some 
young person who speaks perfect English and doesn’t have any crimes. It’s for 
someone who has an issue that complicates their case…Lots of elderly people, 
lots of illiterate people, people who are not highly educated, who really need 
citizenship to access benefits, to get SSI, or they’re refugees or asylees, or on the 
other side they’re the victims of crimes. 
 
However, in an environment with uncertain resources, directors carefully selected clients 
based on likely success. Directors would often express additional taken-for-granted 
informal requirements for selecting cases. Contradicting the repeated appeal to a client’s 
welfare eligibility, organizational directors described opposing characteristics to the 
victimized and vulnerable constituency targeted. Almost unanimously dubbed as “merit,” 
potential clients were strategically chosen on the basis of likely success.  
 
 Working against this uncertainty of producing successful cases, directors used 
intake to screen for characteristics and values that were not legally mandated eligibility 
requirements. While directors discussed clients using welfare rationales, clients were also 
evaluated on principles infused with neoliberal values of hard work and meritocracy, 
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People won’t say this, but it’s a lot easier to work with clients that have some 
initiative. And that’s why there’s an intake process, to get clients that are at least 
invested enough in this to seek help and follow up. It’s really hard to represent 
someone if they’re not going to work hard and show up. And for all social 
services workers and attorneys, it’s like I’m willing to fight for you, but you need 
to fight too and I can’t be the one doing all of the work. It’s like how invested are 
you, are you going to show up, are you going to get this information for me. If 
they aren’t able to clear that hurdle, all right. That for us is a sign that you’re 
going to be a challenge to work with. 
 
Although organizations were providing many services to their clients, and were primarily 
basing who received help within predictable welfare eligibility cases, directors 
continuously stressed auxiliary services as more important. Working with asylum, 
refugee, and convention cases were almost a subsidiary importance to providing them 
with “self-sufficiency” services. 
 
Directors explained that a main goal for their clients was to help them get work 
permits and provide them with employment counseling. Individual agents often explained 
intake processes that essentially hammered in responsibility to clients. For example, the 
Refugee Agency often emphasized tutorials concerning money management, budgeting, 
and scheduling. One director stated, 
In some ways a whole new set of problems are just beginning. Here there’s no 
guarantee of housing, the only guarantee is this welfare, but only for a period of 
time. It’s to teach them to work hard, and make sacrifices and lots of people have 
come to America as immigrants and been successful so it’s totally possible to do 
it if they recognize they can’t just sit around and have people take care of them. 
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Paradoxically, directors rationalized selecting whom to help based on two seemingly 
conflicting frameworks. Working in human services, directors often made choices that 
aided in restricting who had access to services. Comparing cases of merit, viability, and 
success likelihood, interview participants discussed it in terms of zero-sum numbers, 
If a case has merit, if there’s a chance of winning, but it’s not a very good case or 
there’s lots of crimes involved for example, then we have to make a decision 
about whether it’s worth our time to help one person with a very small chance of 
winning or taking on more cases with a higher chance of winning.  
 
Directors measured success of potential clients by resorting to these types of market 
analogies. Individual cases were weighed on their likelihood of being successful and thus 
being an efficient use of monetary and human resources. Each case was evaluated on the 
basis of fulfilling abstract moral or personality characteristics, which were measured 
against estimates of expense. The evaluation of whom to help during the intake process 
mirrored the debates and restrictive nature of the immigration policy environment. Such 
restrictive considerations and limitations on eligible clients diffused across the human 
services. Although no director thought they were providing services to the same 
population, every organization reported helping the same types of noncitizens who all 
represented these narrow and contradictory characteristics. 
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to uncover how human service organizations and professionals 
interact with their regulatory environment and respond to uncertainty and ambiguity in 
their line of work to deliver services to noncitizens. In summary, human service 
organizations, though providing a vital service to noncitizens, play a limited role in 
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allocating rights to immigrants. Organizational effects and director discretion 
significantly narrow the types of cases and clients eligible for social services out of a very 
broad and expansive noncitizen population with varied needs and demands. Arising from 
the pervasive nature of government mandates and restricted funding, human service 
organizations adopt similar practices and patterns of restrictions in their other activities 
including client selection and case prioritization. These practices privilege only a specific 
set of cases: welfare eligibility, asylum, refugee, and crime victims. Additionally, 
professional networks perpetuate this narrow understanding of eligible cases through 
program referrals that develop diffuse and mutually beneficial professional expectations 
and standards of client screening. Further, in dealing with the uncertainty of broad 
missions and limited resources, human service directors act intentionally to serve their 
best interests and organizational priorities. In doing so, directors reaffirm a restrictive 
welfare and immigration environment by using intake to informally screen for a hierarchy 
of personal characteristics that only a narrow portion of noncitizens would fulfill. Finally, 
because organizational homogeneity and individual discretion proved to limit access to 
social services, noncitizens’ ability to enjoy de facto citizenship and the legitimacy of 
social rights was constrained. 
 
The findings of this study are generally consistent with other organizational 
studies that emphasize isomorphic pressures operating in organizational fields; however, 
this study finds that the effects of decoupling may reinforce legal mandates under certain 
conditions. Previous research discussed discretionary behavior of organizations and 
decision-making individuals to be decoupling, arguing that these decisions create legal 
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endogeneity that transforms the effects of law. However, unlike these settings, the human 
services environment assumes instability. Non-profit business models that rely on outside 
funding for revenue render organizations contingent upon other institutions and infuse the 
environment with mentalities that are perhaps less likely to take risks or diverge from 
practices that prove to efficiently use resources/maximize reimbursement revenue. 
Diverging from previous research, my study indicated that directors’ discretionary action 
resonated and affirmed the ideals of the immigration regulatory environment—and rather 
than changing the effects of law, it reaffirmed its effects on the ground.  
 
 That being said, this study is somewhat speculative where it pertains to rights, 
particularly given the assumed validity of the inference that social services result in social 
rights. Noncitizens can experience social rights through a number of ways and other 
institutions, and the entirety of noncitizens’ social citizenship does not rest on human 
service organizations alone. However, the relationship between social rights and social 
services is not tangential. The role of human services as one of the suppliers of social 
rights to noncitizens is not tenuous. Additionally, even though this study proposed that 
human services limit the eligibility and narrow the possibility of noncitizens gaining 
social rights through access to social services, this is not to ignore the benefit of human 
services to these and other groups. This study is nonetheless limited in understanding the 
full scope or breadth of coverage and the degree to which some noncitizens are excluded. 
Further, this study assumed that organizations operated under the same understanding of 
the immigration categories they discussed, though in some situations definitions could be 
expanded beyond formal legal understanding or differ slightly between organizations. 
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Additionally, the sampling of this study could be more proportionally representative of 
different human services. Though this study included a range of different types of 
services, sampling concentrated on legal service organizations. Although case selection 
was consistent across all of the organizations, the concentration of legal services could 
have overshadowed differences across service type. 
 
Greater attention could be paid to providing precise understandings of such 
concepts as “trauma” and deconstruct the organizations use of “victims”. Additionally, 
the involvement of clients and their own agency in the structuration of service provision 
could be considered. This study focuses on noncitizens and their access and enjoyment of 
social rights, but does not include their perspective in the exchange with human service 
organizations or how they actively complicate cases or client identification/identity. 
Further, many noncitizens experience stigmatization and fear of removal, which often 
discourages most from interacting with social institutions. The concentration of services 
to legally permissible welfare groups could be both a function of organizational priorities 
and a representation of those noncitizens willing to make themselves visible to 
“documentation” or susceptible to welfare stigmatization and shaming for using social 
support. More could be done to explore this contributing explanation. Further research 
would benefit from exploring the gaps in service delivery quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Larger scale studies of needs assessments and outreach surveys could determine the 
extent to which organizational and institutional processes affect noncitizen communities 
and service needs. The findings of this study necessarily direct us to the substantive 
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question; in what ways can human services improve to expand diversity of services and 
client access?  
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